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Critiques of cosmopolitanism and its derivatives are explored along the lines of philosophy of politics               
to find several points of contention with the ideology itself. Primarily it is alleged that               
cosmopolitanism is a failed marriage between unfeasible philosophy and incoherent politics, the            
failed synthesis of which leads to a state of apathetic nihilism. Cosmopolitanism is evaluated along               
specific touchpoint of love, religion, morality, ethics and gender. To complete the analysis, an              
alternative explanation to nihilism is given in the form of loss of a special case of knowledge, metis. 
 







This essay was born out of a very contemporary question on the nature of interplay between                
political society and the educational system, and what essential qualities the participants of             
said society possess when it does well and not so well. Naturally such a broad question                
surpasses the scope of a bachelor thesis, so this will instead be a discussion on a special case                  
and the particular rather than the general. Specifically, I chose to look at an early critique of                 
cosmopolitanism as it perhaps is, unbeknownst to many, the most relevant political paradigm             
of education with prominent thinkers like Martha Nussbaum attached to it. I hope the contents               
of this thesis will find the reader in a state of open-mindedness, as historically the word                
cosmopolitanism has been utilized euphemistically to promulgate anti-semitism and as such           
may be negatively charged. During my research I found no such writings and it seems modern                
academia has been diligent in removing texts of such intellectually dishonest nature. But             
genuine criticism of cosmopolitanism in mainstream academia seems rare, despite the           
exploding number of papers published on the subject. I am therefore hoping that a discussion               
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A quick summary 
 
This thesis will concern itself with a plethora of disciplines, but primarily it is to be                
considered as a thesis on the philosophy of politics. The distinction between what is              
philosophy and what is political science, and the agglomerated philosophy of politics is in and               
of itself an interesting separation, but not one that is afforded any consideration in this thesis.                
To introduce the political and philosophical concepts most pertinent to cosmopolitanism,           
namely freedom, it revealed itself to be fruitful to include excerpts from Thucydides and other               
ancient figures. Famed for his rather pessimistic outlook on humanity, not only can he              
introduce the concepts, but also kickstart an understanding of why the freedoms of             
cosmopolitanism seem to be so unattainable in the view of our main subject of study. A brief                 
excursion into the thoughts of other ancient greek thinkers further elucidates this point. 
The main object of study will be the paper ​Cosmopolitanism as Nihilism ​by Mark Kremer,                1
which dissects the subject of cosmopolitanism along the dialectic dimensions of a synthesis             
between philosophy and political science. The study is particularly interesting considering           
given that it focuses on the very time period of the 18th century where we are told                 
cosmopolitanism took shape. In his view cosmopolitanism leads to a nihilistic dystopia, or as              
he very unapologetically puts it :”Ultimately, cosmopolitans are neither philosophers nor           
citizens and their attempt to be both means that they are nothing at all.”.   2
The general structure of arguments is deceptively difficult to disentangle. Take the supposed             
synthetic structure of cosmopolitanism for example, which is described as applicable both to             
modernity and the particular time-period of the past which Kremer is studying:”Today’s            
cosmopolitanism...is an attempt to bring together the universality of philosophy with the            
dedication of politics....This attempted synthesis was also attempted in the eighteenth           
1 Kremer, Mark: Cosmopolitanism as Nihilism: Rousseau's Study of Paris (2006) 
2 Kremer (2016), p. 32 
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century…”. But while Kremer makes liberal use of Parisian examples to advance his points              3
about the synthetic structure, he never returns to modernity to explain why one should              
interpret them as analogous. This is an overall problem with the essay, to cherry-pick a               
specific locale and time-period and extrapolating it to be true for all locales and all times. This                 
inductive process requires an ironclad formal argumentation, which there is none and why this              
analysis is even required. 
While this is problematic, it serves as a convenient analytical starting point and a theoretical               
framework for discussing cosmopolitanism, which is an otherwise slippery subject to define.            
One of the main challenges presented by the dialectic approach is the difficulty in separating               
Kremer’s thoughts from those of his objects of study. At times there might even be as many                 
as 3 separate voices at play (counting Kremer himself as well):”Rousseau, therefore, brings             
two sets of eyes upon Paris: his hero St. Preux and his own eyes—those of the philosopher.”                 4
This is particularly burdensome when the discussion turns to what Rosseau calls the             
gynaecocracy of Paris and one could easily suspect a chauvinistic streak to the discourse. To               5
reign in the theoretic scope of the thesis, a lesser focus will be accorded to issues like the                  
supposed gynaecocracy and more time spent on the educational, ontological and           
epistemological issues. 
The end result of cosmopolitanism according to its detractors is nihilism. As such, one would               
have to perhaps introduce it more, both as a philosophical concept and to give it a theoretical                 
definition for the purpose of analysis. This would however also exceed the scope of this thesis                
and is superfluous. Rather, nihilism in the sense of Kremer and the other writers seems to be a                  
state of meaninglessness; a casting aside of a set of values to the benefit of another set, but                  
with the end result being that no set of values are actually held at all. 
To conclude the thesis, rather than leave it at a descriptive desiccation of Kremer’s study and                
the arguments that were fruitfully extracted from it, an alternative possible source of solutions              
3 Kremer (2016). p. 32 
4 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 34 
5 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 36 
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to the problem of nihilism is discussed. Namely, metis, which is a form of knowledge separate                
from other forms of epistemic knowledge.  6
The argument comes from Scott’s ​Seeing Like a State and in structure is very similar to                
arguments laid out by other authors who, roughly speaking, assert that new forms of thinking               
have pushed out the old, resulting in the loss of valuable skills/knowledge. ​Metis is a valuable                
aspect of knowledge, that Scott writes, is being pushed out by a false sense of progress:                
“...many forms of high modernism have replaced a valuable collaboration between these two             
dialects of knowledge…”. Epistemic deterioration will play a role in almost every aspect of              7
this thesis and is found in love, religion, sex and other areas. 
   
6 Scott, J. C. (2008). Seeing like a state - how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed., p. 
311 







The advent of cosmopolitanism 
 
In response to the horrors of the 20th century, which had seen the advent of the national state                  
and then the two subsequent attempts at what can best be described as collective suicide, ideas                
promoting a post-national mode of the world rose to prominence. Searches and queries for              
cosmopolitan articles and papers yield an ever growing number of results, despite the relative              
obscurity of the term among the common man. 
These ideas weren’t new, they had really begun to take a formalized shape somewhere               
around the 18th century in European philosophy and can loosely be grouped together under              8
the term cosmopolitanism. Instead of belonging to a community organized in the form of a               
nation state, the cosmopolitans belong to broader and universal community of global            
humanism, or as Cheah puts it:”what is imagined is a universal circle of belonging that               
involves the transcendence of the particularistic and blindly given ties of kinship and             
country”. And intuitively, this seems to be a rather uncontroversial and good idea that could               9
only be benign. If unity between people is good (in contrast to let’s say infighting or conflict),                 
as does the nationalist agree, then certainly more unity between more people is more of that                
good thing. Where the nationalist disagrees is on the basis of unity, which he or she takes in                  
part from tribal factors such as shared ancestry and eugenic factors. The merits of such tribal                
modes of thinking have been thoroughly disproven and warrant no further consideration.  
Further, cosmopolitans claim for themselves a very strong philosophical basis of political            
organization: “The bonds of humanity, whether they are predicated in terms of reason or              
moral sentiment, may be the strongest possible ties.”. This too seems like a rather              10
uncontroversial and intuitively sound argument. It both defeats the nationalist’s claims by            
8 ​Cheah, Pheng: Cosmopolitanism. ​Theory, Culture & Society,​ (2006), p. 486 
9 Cheah, P, (2006), p. 487 
10 Cheah, P, (2006), p. 487 
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positing their own as superior, while laying out a moral and intellectual framework as the               
basis for their political philosophy as opposed to those aforementioned tribal factors. 
Why care about cosmopolitanism 
 
“World citizenship, if not a practiced duty, is certainly the moral imperative of today’s liberal               
education” states Kremer who will be the main subject of this thesis. The formulation posits               11
the core tenet of cosmopolitanism of global citizenship in a shared polis as the dominant               
ideology of our educational system. The formulation is deceptively laden with value            
judgements as we will come to see further into this essay.  
Firstly, the reservation of world citizenship (and by extension: cosmopolitanism) not being a             
practiced duty is not so much meant as a lamentation of inefficient or insufficient execution of                
the ideology. Rather, the reservation is meant to introduce the conclusion that            
cosmopolitanism is a lie; something the adherents profess in the abstract but scarcely believe              
or adhere to. This theme of attributing disingenuousness runs through Kremer’s analysis as             
perhaps the only unifying theme of the discussion. Nowhere is this as obvious to the reader as                 
when he quotes Rosseau directly from his work Emile:”Distrust the cosmopolitans who go to              
great lengths in their books to discover duties they do not deign to fulfill around them. A                 
philosopher loves the Tartars so as to be spared having to love his own neighbors”.   12
As to the claims of cosmopolitanism, which he decries as “endless contradiction” , there             13
seems to be not much love lost either as he attributes both the existence of and the solutions                  
to said contradictions to a sense of unserious incompetence:”Cosmopolitan liberalism deals           
with these contradictions by ignoring them, and it can do so because it exists in an atmosphere                 
of unseriousness...”.  14
 
  
11 Kremer, M, (2006), p. 32 
12 Kremer, M, (2006), p. 33 
13 Kremer, M, (2006), p. 32 
14 Kremer, M, (2006), p. 32 
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The problem of cosmopolitanism 
 
The issue remains however, that while we can agree to the denigrations of nationalism as a                
poor organizing principle of political philosophy, both cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans          
agree that the product of cosmopolitanism has been underwhelming. Cheah laments:”It           
becomes an ideology used by a state to attract high-end expatriate workers in the high-tech,               
finance, and other high-end service sectors as well as to justify its exploitation of its own                
citizens and the lower-end migrant workers”. Particular attention is paid to the economic             15
consequences of professing a global interconnectedness and sense of belonging in the            
abstract, while in the concrete one is merely looking for excuses to propagate selfish interests               
unto a broader set of victims and expand the horizon of injustice. The philosophical issue that                
can be identified here then is one of authenticity. 
Cheah does not seem to think that the problems with cosmopolitanism lie with             
cosmopolitanism itself though, but the world. Using his economic argument, one surmises            
that he is accusing the idea of having been hijacked by the right, or what he denotes as                  
Neo-Liberal. Cheah introduces the problem as follows:”One should cast a more           
discriminating eye on the various emergent forms of cosmopolitanism and distinguish them in             
terms of how they are connected to the operations of neoliberal capital”. His theory seems to                16
be that influence of capital outmuscles the influence of people, as “meaningful            
cosmopolitanisms”  can not be generated by a rise in globalization alone. 17
The argument ultimately is that political institutions are needed for the spread of              
cosmopolitanism and the shared values will ensure a uniform global approach to problems             
posed by, primarily, uneven distribution of capital and its consequences.  
The much acclaimed Martha Nussbaum argued a different solution to the lack of globally              
shared values or spread of cosmopolitan ideals in her book ​Not for Profit , which draws               18
15 Cheah, P., (2006), p. 495 
16 Cheah, P., (2006), p. 492 
17 Cheah, P., (2006), p. 492 




heavily on her work on cosmopolitan philosophy. Her core argument seems to be that              
education, and in particular education in the fields of the humanities, is the key towards               
unlocking the potential of cosmopolitanism. This runs contrary to Kremer’s earlier comment            
about cosmopolitanism being the central educational paradigm of the 21st century, as            
Nussbaum argues that the “...humanities and the arts are being cut away, in both              
primary/secondary and college/university education, in virtually every nation of the world”.           19
It seems that she is discussing a more recent and ongoing development however, warning of               
future developments. Quite interestingly, the results she predicts as a consequence of cutting             
out the humanities is that “...nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of                
useful machines,...” that are uncapable to “...understand the significance of another person’s            20
sufferings and achievements.”. This is usefull to us in the sense that Nussbaum is hinting               21
that cosmopolitanism requires a certain kind of knowledge level and acquaintance with            
certain ideas in order to take effect. We will explore this, and Cheah’s focus on institutions                
further in the section about ​metis​. 
 
   
19 Nussbaum, M. C. (2010)​, ​p. 2 
20 Nussbaum, M. C. (2010)​, ​p. 2 





What is a political philosophy? 
A basic definition 
 
First, we need to establish what a genuine philosophy of politics is. For our purposes, it                
suffices to create a baseline model which can serve as an analytical tool for evaluating our                
cosmopolitan friends from Kremer’s study, but also to maybe elucidate why Kremer and             
Rosseau pay them such little respect as to call them “...degradations of philosophy and of               
politics…”.   22
The following paragraph from Strauss (1957) defines the basis of the philosophy of politics              
very simply and elegantly: 
”All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish               
to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about something                 
better. All political action is, then, guided by some thought of better or worse” .  23
This simple paragraph encompasses every wonderful and noble or destructive and deplorable            
political paradigm in the history of mankind. Because “better” or “worse” are value             
judgements, they depend entirely on what our values are. But from this simple proposition can               
arise an immense complexity. 
We could hold values such that we believe strongly in the existence of economic activity, but                
also in the existence of a state which needs to levy taxes to exist. A person’s political stance                  
on the introduction of a tax will therefore be such that the economic activity does not suffer,                 
but it should also be high enough to sustain the state, i.e a problem of mathematical calculus                 
and differential optimization. These problems can be quite hard to solve and thus we end up                
22 Kremer (2016), p. 33 
23 Strauss, Leo: (1957). What is Political Philosophy?, p. 343 
12 
 
not with knowledge, but with guesses or opinions which are not as solid or reliable as                
concrete knowledge. 
We would much prefer to not be given to opinions about what to do, and that is why we form                     
a political philosophy, to guide us as a compass would, to the good society. As Strauss puts it:                  
“ Political philosophy will then be the attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political                
things by knowledge of the nature of political thing”.  24
The problem of ascertaining what the value structure should be like persists however, and              
creates a certain infinite feedback loop. We cannot reason around values without making a              
value judgement. Let’s say we have person A and person B who would opposing views on the                 
merits of the aforementioned tax. If person A wishes to critique person B’s political              
philosophy, according to the model we laid out he or she can only do so by attacking the state                   
of knowledge on epistemological or ontological grounds (the effect of the tax could be in               
dispute), or by attacking B’s values at their core or in their structure (A and B value the                  
economic activity and/or the state differently). By not agreeing to the value structure however,              
it is automatically postulated that their values differ, they could not be the same. 
Strauss comedically remarks: 
“ A man who sees no reason for not despising people whose horizon is limited to their                  
consumption of food and their digestion may be a tolerable econometrist; he cannot say              
anything relevant about the character of human society. A man who refuses to distinguish              
between great statesmen, mediocrities, and insane imposters may be a good bibliographer; he             
cannot say anything relevant about politics and political history”.  25
To Strauss it is not a worthwhile endeavour to study the philosophy of politics without               
considering the values that underpin them. 
  
24 Strauss (1957), p. 344 
25 Strauss (1957), p. 349 
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Early Western models 
 
A brief sketch of early Western political philosophy can elucidate why the critics of              
cosmopolitanism may have such a low opinion of it, and while the argument may seem               
far-fetched at first, a quick indulgence reveals itself to yield quite potent results. 
In Western thought, philosophy of politics is with us all the way from the Great Masters such                 
as Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, in Plato’s The Republic, the ultimate governance of a perfect               
society is envisioned to be lead by philosopher kings. Aristotle, who studied under Plato,              
continued the study of political theory and both served in an advisory capacity to various               
rulers during their lives. It would seem that philosophy has a special practical application to               
governance and politics which it seems to have lost in other branches of societal life and                
academic departments. 
Going further back in time, we can also find philosophy and politics as central focal points                 
for Herodotus and Thucydides, despite their authorships being more directed towards the            
study of military matters. Famously, Thucydides proclaimed his work to be of importance             
beyond times, as he thought the lessons from the Peloponnesian War had lessons for humanity               
that transcended merely the short timespan of his fellow Athenians. 
In particular, his second book which contains the funeral orations of Pericles contains many               
interesting bits of political philosophy. Pericles says, or Thucydides has him saying the             
following to the Athenian citizens: “These take as your model, and judging happiness to be               
the fruit of freedom and freedom of valor, never decline the dangers of war”. He is no doubt                  26
trying to inspire the young Athenians and the survivors of war to continue the armed struggle,                
but nevertheless he weaves in these small nuggets of political philosophy and postulates that              
happiness and freedom are deeply connected. In particular, the notion of interconnectedness            
between what a society can enjoy and that there is some amount of sacrifice that has to take                  
place to reach this enjoyment, seems central to Pericles’s argument and attempt to rally his               
populace. This seemingly simple concept seems to underpin our very civilizational structure,            
26 ​Thucydides., Strassler, R. & Crawley, R.: (1998). ​The landmark Thucydides : a comprehensive guide to the 
Peloponnesian War, ​p. 115 
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or as the renouned Bertrand Russell puts it:” The civilized man is distinguished from the               
savage mainly by prudence, or, to use a slightly wider term, forethought. He is willing to                
endure present pains for the sake of future pleasures, even if the future pleasures are rather                
distant.”. In Pericles’s case, the pleasure then indeed is distant, as directly preceding the              27
connection between freedom and sacrifice, he warns his compatriots that for some people it              
will mean death. 
Having defined this link, we can now again turn to Kremer, who seems to share Russell’s and                 
Pericles’s affinity for sacrifice and its connection to real happiness. Sacrifice, he argues, is              
completely missing from Parisian morals and mode of social interaction, because           
“cosmopolitanism replaces virtue and inner awareness with politeness” and “politeness is           28
falseness” that “...asks nothing in the way of a real sacrifice…” and thus kills any               29 30
possibility of morality in social life. Essentially, if all a member of society needs to               
accomplish to join the social community of society is to master this code of politeness, then                
the value of that community is eroded. Instead of the character of the individual participating               
in society, it is the ability to play by the rules that describes cosmopolitan social life. 
First findings 
Social behaviour has transactional/economic analogies, where membership in society or a            
subset of society comes with both rewards and costs, incentives and punishment and there is a                
common social capital as currency. From Bowles and Gintis we can learn that: “Social capital               
generally refers to trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of                
one's community and to punish those who do not.”. Precisely this trust and concern is what                31
Rosseau’s character remark a glaring lack of, rather preferring “Spartan frankness to false             
politeness” , as the Spartan has virtue by means of his citizenship which he had to earn at                 32
great cost, and the value he derives from citizenship is so great that his friends mean more to                  
him than he does himself. It seems that the social aspect of cosmopolitan political philosophy               
can be characterized exactly as “good rules of the game thus came to displace 
27 Russell, B. (1972). ​A history of western philosophy​. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. , p. 15 
28 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33 
29 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33 
30 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33 
31 Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance. p. 419 
32 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 35 
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good citizens as the sine qua non of good government” , where Bowles and Gintis echo the                  33
lamentations of Kremer, that the 18th century philosophers came to redefine politics and             
philosophy to the detriment of the species.  
So it seems that the primary critique of cosmopolitanism’s effect on social relations can be               
summed up as follows: By emphasizing the rules of interaction in society and removing              
barriers of entry to it, the morality of individual members participating in it suffers and               
paradoxically erodes the very basis for having a society in the first place. It would seem that                 
there is reasonably good argument to be made that this negative effect arises from a               
deficiency of cosmopolitan political philosophy, as we discussed contrasting philosophies of           
Athens and Sparta to find genuine societal care and trust among the citizens who’s basis of                
citizenship was not universal/global and not without cost. 
To further connect the dots between our discussion of the Periclean excerpt of political              
philosophy, the Russellian definition of civilization as the ability to sacrifice present for future              
and the supposed failure of cosmopolitanism, we can consult Kremer’s conclusion which says             
the following about the citizens of Paris:”At one moment, modern man grabs for pleasures as               
if he were about to die and, at another, he accumulates wealth as if he had forever to put aside                    
for his pleasures.” , again hinting at a comprehensive civilizational critique underpinning the            34
disapproval of cosmopolitanism.  
  
33 Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance. p. 419 
 
34 Kremer, M (2016), p. 44 
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Religion, Love and Sex 
Divinity in excess 
 
While the austere ways of Sparta have transcended time by becoming a semantically             
corresponding adjective in most modern languages, the Athenians were famous for excesses.            
Even Socrates, the philosopher par-excellence, imbibes frivolously at times and in his            
Apologia famously lambasts his accusers for immorality and putting a premium on displays of              
fake emotion rather than formality of court proceedings. So perhaps the cosmopolitans can be              
forgiven?  
Russell offers an interesting theory on the relationship of blindly indulging in present             
pleasantries and practicing exaggerated restraint for future pay-offs. His solution to these            
antithetical and extreme opposites is religion and religious rituals. For indeed, both sides of              
the spectrum are extreme, as Russell would probably tell the Spartan “... , prudence may               
easily involve the loss of some of the most important things in life.”. The way out of overt                  35
prudence is by physical or spiritual intoxication, which can range from anything like sexual              
activities, religious experiences of trance or drinking alcohol. In ancient Greece, these            
activities were beholden to religion, specifically Bacchic religion. Indeed, even modern           
religions like Catholicism contain such elements of intoxication such as the ingestion of wine              
and bread as a symbol of Christ, but also mental things such as feelings of connections to the                  
Divine. The process of intoxication seems to be important to the atheist Russell, as it               
“...recovers an intensity of feeling that prudence had destroyed;...” and seems to act as a               36
balancing force in what is described as a perennial conflict of the human condition; prudence               
versus passion. 
This ties in well with our previous discussion of the excesses of cosmopolitan Paris. Perhaps               
Kremer and Rousseau are too harsh in judging the cosmopolitans, as Kremer alleges “Modern              
man is incoherent because his ambitions conflict with his pleasures. “ and connecting the              37
root of this conflict to cosmopolitanism thus advances his arguments against it. Could the              
35 Russell, B,  (1972), p. 16 
36 Russell, B,  (1972), p. 16 
37 Kremer, M (2016), p. 44 
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cosmopolitan himself simply be engaged in the eternal struggle of prudence versus passion?             
Kremer does not seem to think so, rather he castigates them as having simply forfeited all                
responsibilities to the benefit of more leisure: “Country and God are replaced by the salon and                
the theater”. But while one could suppose an overtly pious motif to the critique here, the true                 38
loyalties of Rousseau and Kremer seem to lie with reason, and the reasonable man yearns               
“...to be free from religion,...”. It is therefore again rather a problem of authenticity which is                39
remarked on, cosmopolitanism which professes to liberate the mind from religion has simply             
replaced the object of religious worship. We see clear indications of that pious reverence of               
the arts, as the cosmopolitans are not allowed to freely discuss it. Quoting Rousseau’s              
fictional character:”“It is not as free as you think it, to speak your opinion on this subject.                 
Here, one can dispute everything except their music and opera”.  40
It seems Kremer and Russell are in agreement as to the beneficial effect on reason of the                 
existence of religious or spiritual elements in society. Saying that ancient Greeks would steel              
themselves and thus achieve greater levels, Kremer remarks:“Their reason, so far from being             
a prejudice, is exerted against religion and develops itself by trying itself against its              
adversary”.  41
 
The importance of love 
 
The claim in Kremer seems to be to say that the cosmopolitan is simply incapable of true love                  
or passion, and if anything he certainly only loves himself and his passions are thusly               
confined. Nowhere is this as evident as in the collation of tombstone epitaphs, where the               
Parisian’s epitaph is described as having “...the bombastic character of a man who wants to be                
thought of as a god” while the ancient examples used to contrast show positive character               42
traits, chiefly of selflessness and a healthy relation to death.  
38 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 36 
39 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
40 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 46 
41 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 34 
42 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 45 
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The loss of true love in society is catastrophic not just in the emotional sense, but in the                  
epistemic sense as well:”... acts of knowing or inquiring have as a necessary condition the               
human person's love, desire, or care.”. This epistemological deterioration is explored further            43
both on love and sex, but particularly in the section on ​metis​. 
Selfishness, self-aggrandizing and self-obsession is a charge not just frequently repeated in            
Kremer, but is a centerpiece of Hanson & Heath’s critique of the cosmopolitan concept of               
multiculturalism in academia in ​Who Killed Homer ​:”..., we learn little of the Greeks from              
today’s theorists, but a great deal about their own all-encompassing narcissism”. They go on              44
to quote Page Dubois and comment on the frequent use of personal pronouns pertaining to               
Dubois himself. Finally, they finish by accusing this subset of academics to be inauthentic,              
professing something they do not themselves adhere to, precisely as we see in Kremer’s              
description of cosmopolitan Parisian philosophers. 
Man’s relation to his inevitable death recurs frequently in Kremers text and emerges as ever               
more important. By the end, it has to be considered one of his central arguments against                
cosmopolitanism. Writing of the upper class, he says:”The failure of civil man to attach              
himself to others is inextricably connected to his failure to situate himself in relation to death                
and eternity.”.  45
 
Sidenotes on death 
 
Before continuing our discussion on attachments in the particular forms of love and sex, we               
need to discuss death, as it figures so heavily in the discussion on other matters. The endless                 
barrage of criticism in Kremer along multiple avenues of thought creates a confusing flood of               
arguments. Are we to understand the relationship to death as the primary cause of lack of                
attachement to others, or is it the polite falseness? One possible explanation seems to be that                
the “civic man”, and his supposedly faulty relation to death, denotes an explicitly aristocratic              
class of people. The upper-class critique runs through Kremers text as indeed it seems to run                
43 Benedict, J. L. (2017). Authentic cosmopolitanism: love, sin, and grace in the Christian university, p. 123 
44 Hanson, Victor., & Heath, John.,  (2001). ​Who killed Homer?​. Berkeley: ​Encounter Books, p. 96 
45 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 44 
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through most criticism of cosmopolitanism. Cheah calls it “...the popular view of            
cosmopolitanism as an elite form of rootlessness and a state of detachment…”  46
Our discussion of Greek political philosophy was closely linked to death, especially death in              
battle. There is a need to distinguish between acceptance of death, natural or for example in                
the course of battle, and a devaluation of death, such as for example the fascist creed of                 
deliberately seeking death to the supposed benefit of the state. When Pericles delivers his              
funeral oration, he remarks that “... heroes have the whole earth for their tomb;...” , which is                47
quite a cosmopolitan claim, as the appeal of sacrifice is given a universal and transnational               
reach. Quite to the contrary of a fascist, Pericles does not wish for death, he does not seek for                   
his audience to wish it, but he surely wishes to establish respect, gratefulness and a               
commemorative sense. 
A speech that is quite reminiscent of this is the Gettysburg Adress by Abraham Lincoln. In                 
the speech, much like Pericles, Lincoln mentions death as meaningful sacrifice and the             
obligations of the living to the dead by virtue of that meaningfulness. Importantly, death and               
sacrifice also seem to lose some their meaning, as Lincoln urges his listeners not to let the                 
dead have died in vain. We can safely conclude that the political philosophies of              
non-cosmopolitan societies included some sort of reasoning of the human relationship to            
death, now let us return to our cosmopolitan friends. 
Kremer contends that a multitude of malaises derive from an ill defined relation to death.               
“The bombast characteristic of his tombstones, his music, and his philosophy is a             
consequence of not living in relation to death, for only a man who has forgotten death would                 
try to bloat himself into a god.”. Having no relationship to death means the cosmopolitan is                48
free to leave his humanity for the status of an immortal god, but we also learn that death is                   
still an irksome feature of life that bothers the cosmopolitan. The passage: “Death is too ugly                
for the marquesses to look at. Like crime, there is no way to laugh at it, and, therefore, like                   
crime, it is ignored.” shows how cosmopolitan entertainment has to censor out or comically              49
46 Cheah, P, (2006), p. 487 
47 Thucydides., (1998), p. 115 
48 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 45 
49 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 39 
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distort death so as to not be an affront to the delicate sensibilities of the cosmopolitan crowd.                 
Ultimately, it is politeness which brings about these sensibilities and therefore precludes death             
from entering in the philosophical thought of cosmopolitanism seriously.  50
 
Love and sex continued 
 
With this detour completed we are free to return to love and sex, which occupy a lot (the word                   
love occurs 105 times) of Kremers discussion as much of the analysis is done on the fictional                 
love letters of Rousseau's writings. We already saw that a faulty relationship to death brings               
about a lack of attachment, and attachment is one form of love. Our previous discussion of                
sacrifice is also pertinent to love, as love usually involves some kind of sacrifice between the                
two interested parties. Politeness is the culprit, as it “...asks nothing in the way of a real                 
sacrifice...it liberates them from the demands,...even of romantic love.”. Thus, love is            51
nonexistent with the cosmopolitans, but the causal chain is greater. 
Love, taken in the greater Augustinian sense and not strictly romantic, is dispensed with as               
well, as the cosmopolitan is derided as a hypocritical liar right off the bat:”... the European                
cosmopolitan loves the Turk half way around the world, so that he will not have to love his                  
own neighbor at home.”. This statement also introduces the impossibility of friendship and             52
love of hobbies as the only love the cosmopolitan has is for himself.  
As to the “romantic” relationships that are mentioned, they are characterized by “hedonism             
and faithlessness” as opposed to the narrator Rousseau employs, who is elevated by love              53
above the moral deficiencies that he observes in others. This derision of casual sexual              
relations as “hedonism” would be problematic to modern readers who are products of the              
sexual liberation, would it not be for the observation that these casual sexual relations were               
the only sexual relation there was for the cosmopolitans. Vanity reigns in the worst excesses               
of sexual hedonism, but it “...is a substitute for modesty, rather than civic virtue.” and sexual                54
50 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 38 
51 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
52 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
53 Kremer, M., (2016). p. 35 
54 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 40 
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partners are discarded immediately after the act, as even vanity cannot mask the underlying              
contempt everyone has for eachother:”the final act of their sexual play; they conclude with              
mutual contempt.”.   55
For women there is no love or attachment to be had or desired, but “Sex and vain attentions                  
make up her erotic life.”. And why should she, given that the character qualities of the men                 56
are summarized as: “His gallantry is an empty form. He knows what he wants and how to win                  
it.”. The men have no genuine interest in anything but themselves, certainly not in a serious                57
romantic relationship that would require trust, honesty and sacrifice (a cosmopolitan           
three-strike rule according to Kremer/Rousseau).  
Sexual relations are as confusing as they are, again, hypocritical. Paradoxically, the readily             
available supply of sexual partners fosters a spirit of competition among women, which in              
turn breeds contempt. The women of cosmopolitanism learn to treat men like puppets whom              
they can manipulate with sex. On the other hand, among men it breeds a contempt for women,                 
but again it hypocritical:”If the male were truly contemptuous of the female, he would not               
have sex with her, not even to display his disdain.”.   58
In conclusion, love and sex is just another path down the road of nihilism, as the overly                 
complicated and paradoxical nature of love and sex with the cosmopolitan setting seems to              





55 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 42 
56 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 40 
57 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 41 
58 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 42 
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Next stop: Nihilism 
 
We are now ready fully describe the mechanisms of cosmopolitanism that lead to a state of                
nihilism, and thus it is advisable to take a brief excursion into it and assemble the argument.                 
Kremer defines Rousseau as having made a “comedy about nihilism” , sort of similar to the               59
novel American Psycho and its depiction of insider people during the rise of high-finance.  
As we saw earlier, a special emphasis is put on the erosion of morals via extraneous “rules of                  
the game”, the quality of the citizen of the polis is of little importance and sensing that, his                  
impetus for quality is eroded. Given to his pleasures, and religiously enslaved to the arts there                
is scarcely any description of citizens with dedication, only drifters. As everyone is so              
indistinguishable from one another in character and taste, cosmopolitanism fosters a herd            
mentality of clones, resulting in what Kremer calls a collective of “easy and smug nihilism”.  60
Politically, politeness rears its ugly head again. Because politeness not only applies to social              
life, but to the political arena as well, the tone of debate is a muted and disinterested one.                  
“There is neither attack nor defense because there is indifference.”. The importance of             61
appearing civil precludes the possibility of a real or lively debate. 
There is a clear class-based component to the critique, one that we saw in Cheah that                
cosmopolitans are aware of (but very readily dismiss). Similar to the argument of universality              
and hypocrisy, Rousseau seems to claim that cosmopolitans don’t care any more for poor              
people than they care for their neighbor, they don’t care at all unless they are involved                
themselves. Content to just frequent the opera and make false promises of shared wealth, they               
are described by Rousseau as being nothing: “If the Parisians are not citizens, philosophers,              
poets, lovers, husbands and wives, or devotees, then what are they? The answer is that they                
are bourgeois or what Rousseau also calls nothing. The letters are a comprehensive account of               
cosmopolitan nihilism”.   62
59 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35 
60 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
61 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35 
62 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 34 
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Note on Kremer’s style 
 
Now that we have discussed Kremer quite a bit, it is feasible to introduce a critical remark on                  
the style with which he argues in his paper. Essentially, he posits that there is an inherent                 
problem with the theoretical construct of cosmopolitanism, but presents mostly practical and            
empirical claims to support this thesis rather than attacking the theory itself. This is a weak                
point in his study, because there is no self-evident link between the social interactions and               
activities of a particular people in a particular time-period and the philosophical ideas to              
which they may or may not subscribe to. It is as if one would argue the merit or fallacy of                    
communism by only looking at a subset of people in, let’s say, Soviet Russia during the 50’s                 
when it was very successful.  
Further, his literary style is very poignant, callous and crass. This tone is taken in ​Who Killed                 
Homer as well and is unnecessary for the issues discussed, in fact it rather obscures them                
under a layer of vitriol.  
Taking insipiration from Nussbaum and Cheah, the analysis will now proceed with a focus on               
political institutions and epistemology.  
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Lost knowledge: metis 
 
The importance of agriculture 
 
Again we must venture out on a bifurcated detour similiar to our earlier discussion of political                
philosophy, sacrifice and civilization to develop the argument fully. The aim will be to              
establish agriculture, class and political institutions as central to a discussion of loss of              
societal knowledge and values. And again, we shall see that the patient reader is rewarded in                
the end. 
In the earlier passage introducing greek political philosophy we encountered Bertrand Russell             
and his definition of a civilized society or human. He makes a peculiar observation directly               
succeeding the definition concerning the special relationship between civilization and          
agriculture:”This habit began to be important with the rise of agriculture, no animal and no               
savage would work in the spring in order to have food next winter,...”. Particular attention is                63
paid to separate instinctual behaviour which is merely a programmed or unconscious            
behaviour and thus not the calculated forethought which characterizes a state of civilization.  
However, Kremer alleges that these practitioners of agriculture have no place in cosmopolitan             
society:”The rusticity of the country and the virtues of a citizen would be offensive to polite                
society”. An interesting corollary to the agricultural subcontext can, again, be found with the              64
Greeks who according to Hanson & Heath apparently “...said that war and agriculture are              65
the two most important things we humans do.”. Further, we are told that no other actions                
better “...reveal virtue…, civilization and barbarism.” which have been key components of the             
critique of cosmopolitanism. 
 
  
63 Russell, B, (1972), p. 15 
64 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33 
65 Hanson & Heath,  (2001)​, p. 58 
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A touch of class 
 
As we saw, agriculture and class seems inextricably linked. The critique of Kremer turns to               
aspects of class and distribution of wealth at many times, noting that “... the discrepancy               
between rich and poor in Paris is greater than any place on earth”. The odd thing is that we                   66
already saw Cheah agree that cosmopolitanism can lead to class-based oppression. The fault             
according to him lies not with cosmopolitanism however, but with insufficient institutions: ”...             
philosophers of the French Enlightenment could not envision feasible political structures for            
the regular and widespread institutionalization of mass-based cosmopolitan feeling” and he           67
even quotes Rosseau to his advantage on this very subject. More specifically, Cheah attributes              
the modern failures of cosmopolitanism to Habermas and the inadequacies of his theoretical             
framework, which roots cosmopolitan political institutions in the liberal wellfare state , and            68
thus it is feasible to solve the problems via adaptations of political structures. 
Perhaps, rather than accepting the notion of cosmopolitanism as a cul de sac road to nihilism,                 
we could find another possible explanation of Kremers and Rosseaus disgust then, by looking              
at targeted political action. 
 
  
66 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35 
67 Cheah, P, (2006), p. 487 





In ​Seeing Like A State​, precisely this argument of political actions and institutions in the name                
of improving the human condition is discussed, with a special eye towards deleterious effects              
of such actions. The general thrust of theory as it pertains to this thesis, is that whenever a                  
regime wishes to use political action to remake a society as an exogenous agent, the               
impossibility of perfectly describing modes of society and production sneaks its way into that              
political action and usually causes harm. Scott writes:”... the necessarily thin, schematic            
model of social organization and production animating the planning was inadequate as a set of               
instructions…” because “Formal order, to be more explicit, is always and to some             69
considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not            
recognize”. ​Metis ​is not necessarily the informal process, but can be composite parts that              70
make up the sum total result of an informal. Just like ​logos ​, it is a subset, but much more                   
difficult to define: “...practical skills, variously called know-how (savoir faire or arts de faire)              
common sense, experience, a knack, or ​metis.​”. ​It seems to be one of those things that one                 71
can rather easily recognize when met with it in person, but then has a hard time explaining or                  
describing it in a satisfactory fashion. For example, what makes a good diplomat? One may               
study the sciences of history, politics and international relations, yet we still have the phrase               
of “the art of diplomacy” which signifies something other than the level of scientific              
proficiency, but yet also not merely courtesy or behaviourisms. Rather, it is perhaps the              
practical application of courtesy and knowledge in combination, to the problem of diplomacy. 
Scott gives several examples of ​metis in agricultural contexts, citing the ubiquitous farmers              
almanacs of yonder, that usually contained local adaptations as to the optimal times for              
sowing certain crops in that particular area. But the applications needn’t be that practical,              
although they seem to require a utility in use. Leadership skills that inspire and elevate a                
community can be counted as ​metis​ too. 
69 Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 310 
70 Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 310 
71 Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 311 
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Indeed, the spatial geographic difference in metis seems to be a big part of the reason why                 
central political action fails. Scott uses phrases like “...based on more universalistic units of              
measurement.” to hint at the fact that in fact, one size does not fit all. This is problematic for                   72
the cosmopolitan, who we saw takes universality to be one of the organizing principles of his                
political philosophy.  
Further: “The necessarily implicit, experiential nature of metis seems central.”. It seems that             73
metis​, even if described and understood, is not transferable by traditional learning. It is              
something that has to be experienced in order to be actualized and inher in a person. We can                  
recognize this distinctive feature from military affairs, where one might be very learned as to               
the nature of war, but can not truly understand its horrors unless having experienced it               
himself. This does not bode well for our cosmopolitan friends, of whom we learned that they                
spent all of their waking hours consumed with leisure. In fact, no mention is made about                
learning or exertion in any capacity. It seems problematic for Cheah’s assumption as well,              
that cosmopolitan identity and feeling would spread more successfully under the guise of             
political institutions. Scott takes an even more damning view of those who would use              
institutional reach for this purpose: “The relation between scientific knowledge and practical            
knowledge is, as we shall see, part of a political struggle for institutional hegemony by experts                
and their institutions.”. The composite argument against institutions as harbingers of           74
cosmopolitan success then becomes that a) it is not feasible to assume universality is              
applicable across a the spatial divide of the world, b) social order rests several subsets of                
knowledge, some of which can not be transferred as easily as concrete epistemic forms and c)                
that the agent who uses political institutions to such an end is actually more interested in his                 
political hegemony than, what Strauss told us was, moving society forward towards the better. 
Returning again to Kremer, he alleges that cosmopolitan theory is fraught with contradictions             
as they pertain to the universality of humanity and humanism:”...man is a cultural being              
belonging to his unique history and that he is a natural being belonging to a common                
humanity,... and so on in endless contradiction.”. On one hand, f man has a unique history,                75
72 Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 312 
73 Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 315 
74 Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 311 
75 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
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then the axiom of universality does not apply and we can forget forging humanity under the                
umbrella of global political institutions. On the other hand, if he is a natural being in a                 
common humanity, then we simultaneously strip him of his uniqueness in culture and history,              
which arguably constitute some form of ​metis​. To solve this, cosmopolitanism teaches            
tolerance. But Kremer laments: “If there is more toleration, there is less belief in anything.               
Despite the goods provided by cosmopolitanism and despite its overcoming certain           
prejudices, it only creates new and more destructive prejudices”. An example of how             76
tolerance in cosmopolitan society fails to respect the status of its minorities or foreign guests               
is provided by the arts:“...foreigners do not dare speak their minds about the opera…”.              77
Hence, the multicultural paradigm in Kremer’s view destroys the prospect of both parts of the               
synthesis via the dialectic process. What is proposed is that instead of the failed synthesis,               
perhaps the loss of ​metis is the actual problem, as for example in the case of tolerance and                  
politeness, which prohibits foreigners to freely speak their mind about the arts and thus              
cosmopolitan society loses valuable external opinions and points of view. Kremer, instead,            
alleges that the foreigner himself is not well served by the supposed tolerance shown to him                
by cosmopolitan society, giving the example of Rousseau’s Swiss character:”St. Preux is            
never more alone than when he is in society, and his only consolation is to lock himself up by                   
himself” as mostly anything offends him in Paris. Because of cosmopolitanism’s insistence            78
on tolerance and politeness, the failed synthesis arrives at a nihilism of values that is offensive                
to foreigner and Parisian alike. The difference may seems subtle, but if we assume that the                
loss of ​metis is the problem of cosmopolitanism, one could envision a solution as opposed to                




76 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
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Applications to Gender 
 
To further elucidate the merits of the theory that loss of knowledge, rather than nihilism, is a                 
fruitful tool for analysis and reading, let’s apply this way of thinking to the (in this author’s                 
view) problematic theme of gender in Kremer. 
In the duality of agriculture and war that we met earlier, we are also reminded that the Greeks,                  
through Heraclitus, thought of war as the father of us all and agriculture, or more accurately                
nature, as the mother. While “female” agriculture seems to be the patient process of              79
prudently creating sustenance, “male” war is the passionate business of destruction of what             
has been built up. This assignment of gender to phenomena of the world is also found in                 
gnostic traditions and mythology. The duality runs strangely akin to Russell’s theory of a              
perpetual interplay of passion and prudence, and while they are separate and different, they              
both need each other for balance and thus become equal in value in proportion to how much is                  
needed of each to achieve balance. Applying this model analogously, we thus have a basis               
from which to discuss the gender relations that figure so heavily in Kremer on what seems a                 
gender neutral setting. Gender in cosmopolitan Paris is as already mentioned, problematic.            
Therefore, to salvage a more neutral reading we can use this theoretical model instead of               
sifting through what otherwise would be pure misogyny. 
Women are the rulers of cosmopolitan Paris, by proxy and not through explicit institutions,              
but through control of the men which they make “effeminate”. The use of the more               80
pejorative effeminate, rather than the neutral feminine, is peculiar. It again could imply that              
what Rosseau and his fictional characters judge harshly, Kremer instead wishes to subtly             
differentiate and attribute to the aforementioned problem of authenticity. In other words, it is              
not a matter of true feminine behaviour, but a bastardized version of it, hence the use of the                  
word effeminate. There is some support for this if we look at the description of how women                 
are valued and evaluated by themselves and others in cosmopolitan Paris. “Shocking            
immodesty changes the nature of female pride by teaching that the most honorable woman is               
79 Hanson & Heath, (2001), p. 58 
80 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 36 
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the one who is desired the most, which means by the most men.”. It seems Kremer is                 81
lamenting the reduced state of women in Paris, affirming for them the ability to be more than                 
objects of desire of “effeminate men”. The ideal cosmopolitan male seems to be a source of                
misogyny by virtue of himself, as the cosmopolitan state-of-affairs is to upheave the             
supposedly natural distance between man and woman, and thus male chastity becomes rare             
and idealized: “Chastity, in fleeing the female, becomes the virtue of the male. The female               
must now submissively seek to be degraded,...”. Having already reduced women to merely             82
be judged by their number of suitors, cosmopolitanism further reduces women by having             
them chase the men. 
This rather heavy hitting line of discussion does not seem to go unnoticed; Kremer              
remarks:”Rousseau is not a critic of compassion in general any more than he is a critic of the                  
influence of women in general. What he does object to is the hypocritical use of cosmopolitan                
when it is pushed beyond the narrow limits of real feeling and action.”. So it seems Kremer                 83
is at least aware of the tone of the article as it pertains to women. Instead it seems that what he                     
is trying to get at is nature, and that when nature is corrupted as he alleges with                 
cosmopolitanism, the changes on man and woman become such that they warrant extensive             
criticism. In fact, one could venture so far as to say that what is being critiqued is a                  
pseudo-man and pseudo-woman, imposters of their gender.  
Already in his introduction, Kremer levies the charge that cosmopolitanism fuses politics and             
philosophy by denying nature. It seems then, that what really bothers Rousseau and Kremer              84
is not gender in the concrete, but that earlier civilizational interplay we discussed, where both               
genders are on equal footing because of nature, not because of a lack of it. Having artificially                 
removed the natural differences, the status of both man and woman is reduced. 
But while the male still holds all the material advantages of a more patriarchal society, and                 
can compete freely along those lines with other men, the female has to compete for resources                
and social status in other ways. “It is, thus, that ceasing to be women, … they prefer their rank                   
81 Kremer, M., (2006), p. 40 
82 Kremer, M., (2006), p. 42 
83 Kremer, M., (2006), p. 37 
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to their sex, and imitate prostitutes…”. Alas, the point closely resembles that of Cheah that               85
we saw earlier, where he complained that unequal competition was one of the reasons for the                
failure of cosmopolitanism. Looking at our combined Hanson & Heath - Russell model of              
nature as gendered, we found that in fact competition between the sexes was an interdepency,               
where passion needed to be reigned in by prudence, and prudence not fruitfull without some               
passion. Examining gender, we have now extracted this counterclaim, that cosmopolitanism           
is what turns competition into something horrible. 
The corollary to our discussion of ​metis ​is that nature seems to have put high demands on                  
both man and woman when it comes to requirements for successfull participation in society              
and life in general. By casting nature aside, it seems both man and woman lose important                
social skills and moral heading, i.e the same as loss of ​metis​. About this Kremer               
writes:”Modesty is accompanied by a desire for an exclusive and permanent attachment and is              
therefore a virtue proving a woman’s worthiness. Respect for it proves a man’s” and that               86
modesty ultimately is informed by an understanding of sexual desire, one’s own wellfare and              
status and that without it, there can be no love. But the Parisians are instead confined to act                  
out their pseudo-gendered roles and thus show no competencies in social skills. 
   
85 Kremer, M., (2006), p. 40 







In summary, the problems of cosmopolitanism seem real, as we saw that both cosmopolitan              
thinkers like Cheah and several non-cosmopolitans agree that there are areas of deficiency.             
Where they disagree is about where the problems originate from, its detractors argue they are               
with cosmopolitan theory and its defendants seem to argue that it is a mix of not enough                 
institutional power and to a lesser extent an overreliance on Western liberal democracy as a               
one-size-fits-all model.  
Moreover, the problems with cosmopolitanism seem to be important. The mass of literature             
about cosmopolitanism is certainly growing at a rapid pace, and is produced by a large               
number of people and certainy some very noteworthy names. Rousseau is one of the greats in                
European history of philosophy, while thinkers such as Nussbaum occupy similiarly elevated            
positions in the modern age. What is fascinating however is that at many aspects, the same                
sources lie at the heart of vile criticism as in Kremer and simultaneously serve as a basis for                  
the opposite stance as in Nussbaum:”... Rousseau’s great work Emile, which describes an             
education aimed at rendering the young man autonomous, capable of his own independent             
thought and of solving practical problems on his own, without reliance on authority.”. Now,              87
Emile ​is one of the most prominent sources in Kremer, whose aggregate assessment of              
cosmopolitanism certainly does not contain autonomous thinkers:” Cosmopolitanism is not a           
freedom for anything and instead of culminating in free minds, promotes mass conformity to a               
herdlike existence.”. It is simply fascinating to see the rift between the two sides, and one                88
has to wonder how similar sources can underpin two such different conclusions. 
87 Nussbaum, M. C., (2010)., p. 53 
88 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33 
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A further example of the same phenomenon being at the heart for both pro- and               
con-cosmopolitan thinking was shown in the case of gender and competition. Moreover, it             
offered some merit to the critique of cosmopolitanisms insistence on changing nature. 
Along the basic models of philosophy of politics, the detractors of cosmopolitanism can be              
described as having a different value structure and when they look at the same phenomenon               
but arrive at contrarian conclusions, they are not seeing different facts, they are simply              
making a value judgment along Straussian lines. Interestingly, the detractors affirm no ability             
for cosmopolitanism to make value judgements:”There is no right or wrong but only relative              
“values”...” and those values by definition of multiculturalism have no hierarchy of better or              89
worse. 
There is a very strong conservative breeze that blows through the criticisms we have met               
with, decrying cosmopolitanism as irresponsible and unserious. The inhabitant of Paris “exists            
in an atmosphere of unseriousness, where human beings are accustomed to saying things that              
have no meaning and where there are no political responsibilities.” and this supposedly             90
childish environment can breed quite dangerous results, as “...;liberty without responsibility is            
more often savagery;...”.  91
This savagery takes the shape of nihilism, where people behave inauthentically and word             
never matches deed, ideals remain unattainable despite promises of the contrary, friendship            
and love are dead, etc. ad nauseam. 
Finally, instead of beating the dead horse of dialectic synthesis, an alternative synthesis was              
produced. Namely, that state intervention inadvertently disrupts local communities and in the            
process destroy a special subset of knowledge, ​metis​. This seems to correlate better with              
scholars like Scott, who are not engaged in the quite contemptuous debate on the merits of                
cosmopolitanism. It seems to echo Nussbaums sentiments as well, that a lack of some kind of                
knowledge, and therefore educational elements, is at the heart of the problem. 
89 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 32 
90 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 32 
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